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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

ABRAHAM MARIO SHAFFER,

:

Case No. 20090274-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) (2008), where the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court for
disposition. In trial court proceedings, the court entered judgment and conviction against
Appellant Abraham Mario Shaffer for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008). The judgment is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Whether the defendant is entitled to a remedy for the prosecutor's breach of the
plea agreement during sentencing proceedings.
Standard of Review. Since defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's
remarks at sentencing or move to have them stricken, the issue is raised under the plainerror and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrines. Under the plain-error doctrine, this
Court will assess whether the error was plain, obvious, and prejudicial. See State v. Hale,
No. 20040363-CA, 2005 UT App 305, *l-2 (applying the plain-error standard to

1

defendant's claim that the State breached its agreement with respect to recommendations
at sentencing; and remanding for specific performance). Under the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel doctrine, this Court will assess whether defense counsel's failure to
object constituted deficient performance, and whether it prejudiced the defendant. See
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
Preservation: The issue was not preserved. Consequently, Shaffer has raised it
under the plain-error doctrine and the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. See
Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *l-2; Templin 805 P.2d at 186.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at
Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend. VI (ensuring the right to counsel); U.S. Const, amend.
XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On February 4, 2008, the State filed an Information against Shaffer for aggravated
robbery. (R. 1-4). The State gave notice that it intended to seek gun and gang
enhancements. (R. 1-4). On April 17, 2008, the trial court conducted a preliminary
hearing. (R. 41-42). At the conclusion, the court bound Shaffer over for trial on the
charge. (R. 42). On December 15, 2008, the State and Shaffer entered into an
agreement. Shaffer agreed to plead guilty to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony
(see R. 95-96), and the State agreed to dismiss the enhancements and to recommend two
years in jail "with credit for time served and a suspended prison sentence," among other

things. (R. 99). On March 9, 2009, the trial court sentenced Shaffer to an indeterminate
term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. (R. 113). On April 3, 2009, Shaffer
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 116-117). The appeal is timely. Utah R. Crim. P. 3 and 4
(2008). Shaffer is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 30, 2008, three men entered a Spring Communications store. (See R.
94:5-6, 8, 13). According to employee Cassidy Mills, Shaffer was among the three. (R.
94:8-9). Mills testified that Shaffer pointed a gun at him (R. 94:18-20, 34), and the men
took seven phones and $35 from the till. (R. 94:17-23). After the men left the store,
Mills called the police and a customer assisted him in identifying the car. (R. 94:22-23).
The police arrested the men later that evening. (See R. 94:46-51 (stating an officer
located the suspect vehicle and set up surveillance at their home); 94:65-73 (stating
officers had the suspects in custody and located cellular phones and a weapon)).
On February 4, 2008, the State charged Shaffer with aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony offense. (R. 1-4). The State also charged the two codefendants. (R. 5
(referencing codefendants)). The State notified Shaffer that it would seek both gun and
gang enhancements, which would add several years to a prison term. (See R. 1-4); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203.l(3)(e); 76-3-203.8(2)(a) (2008). In separate proceedings the
codefendants were convicted of second-degree-felony robbery and placed on probation.
(R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, page 4).
On December 15, 2008, Shaffer entered a guilty plea to the first degree felony
offense. (See R. 95-102; 131:7-8). In exchange and as an "inducement[]" (R. 131:3), the

prosecutor promised, first, that she would not "pursue the gun and gang enhancements"
against Shaffer (R. 99; 131:3-4); second, that she would recommend "both to the - presentence investigator and at the time of sentencing" (R. 131:4) that Shaffer serve two
years in jail with credit for time served (R. 99; 131:4); and third, that she would join in a
motion to reduce the conviction from a first-degree-felony offense to a second-degreefelony offense upon Shaffer's successful completion of probation. (R. 99:131:4); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2008) (allowing for a reduction in the conviction). A copy of the
plea agreement (R. 95-102) is attached as Addendum C; and a copy of the change-of-plea
transcript (R. 131) is attached as Addendum D.
The trial court advised Shaffer that it was not bound by the prosecutor's promises,
and that it may sentence Shaffer to a prison term of five years to life. (R. 131:5-6).
Shaffer said he understood (R. 131:6), and he entered the guilty plea. (R. 131:7-10).
On March 9, 2009, the trial court conducted sentencing proceedings. (R. 132). As
of that date, Shaffer had served more than 13 months in jail. (See R. 134: AP&P
Presentence Report, page 4 (stating Shaffer "was booked into jail" on January 30, 2008)).
During sentencing, the prosecutor did not make the specific recommendations as she had
promised. (See R. 132:13-14). Rather, the prosecutor requested "gang conditions" at
sentencing. She stated, "I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant may claim
he's not a member of a gang, given that the co-defendants he was with were members of
gangs, they're documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that he needs
to have gang conditions." (R. 132:13). Notably, the defense did not verify a need for
gang conditions. (See R. 131:8-9; 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2, 3-4, and 6).

Rather, both defense counsel and Shaffer specified that Shaffer was not involved in a
gang. (R. 132:7-8; 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2 and 6).
In addition, the prosecutor recommended "at [a] minimum, another year in jail
followed by 36-months probation." (R. 132:14). She did not recommend credit for time
served and she specified that the victim, Cassidy Mills, "felt that the defendant should be
incarcerated for as long as possible." (R. 132:14). Thereafter, the trial court ordered
Shaffer to serve a prison term of five years to life. (R. 131:15; 113). A copy of the
sentencing transcript (R. 132) is attached as Addendum E.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor made promises to Shaffer to induce him to enter into a plea agreement for a first degree felony offense. She promised to make a recommendation to the
agent preparing the presentence report and to the court that Shaffer serve a two-year jail
term with credit for time served followed by probation, and she promised to abandon gun
and gang enhancements. As a result of the promises, Shaffer entered a guilty plea on a
first degree felony offense. Thereafter, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement.
Specifically, she failed to make any recommendations to the agent preparing the
presentence report. Consequently, the agent recommended that Shaffer be sentenced to
prison for an indeterminate term, which may be for life. In addition, while Shaffer had
already served a year and 39 days in jail, the prosecutor recommended an additional year
in jail with "no credit" for time served, she made disparaging remarks about Shaffer's
family to send the message that he would not "behave" in the community if given a
reduced incarceration term, she continued to brand him as affiliated with gangs, and she

specified that the victim was requesting the longest possible sentence for the offense: life
in prison. Given the prosecutor's breach, Shaffer is entitled to a remedy. Since trial
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's conduct, Shaffer has raised the issue here
under the plain-error doctrine and the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine.
ARGUMENT
THE PROSECUTOR'S BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT
WARRANTS REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
A. PLEA AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW.
(1) Contract Principles Apply to Plea Agreements.
"c[P]lea bargaining' is an essential component of the administration of justice,"
and when "[p]roperly administered," it is encouraged. Santobello v. New York* 404 U.S.
257, 260 (1971). Plea agreements can result in the prompt disposition of criminal cases
without trial, thus saving the State time, money, and other resources. See_ id^
"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts and have applied principles derived
from contract law to plea agreements." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (citing, Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; State v. West 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah
1988)). For example, plea agreements - like contracts - recognize the principle of
consideration. In State v. West, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The nature of plea
bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the parties involved to reach a
mutually desirable agreement. A plea bargain is a contractual relationship in which
consideration is passed." 765 P.2d at 896.

Moreover, "[w]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled." State v. Smith, No. 20060473-CA, No. 20060474-CA, 2006
UT App 510, *1 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261
(requiring "fairness in securing [an] agreement between an accused and a prosecutor").
(2) The Government Is Held to a Higher Standard in Plea Agreements.
Plea agreements also differ from contracts in relevant respects. Specifically, "in
interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, courts may in certain
circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the defendant." Patience,
944 P.2d at 387 (citing, ^ , United States v. Rinzlinz, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993)
("c[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a
greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in
plea agreements.'") (citation omitted)). In addition, courts construe ambiguities in the
plea agreement against the government and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g.. United
States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. FrancoLopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); InreAltro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999).
That is because, unlike ordinary contracts, the government enjoys significant bargaining
power and the plea agreement calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional
rights. See, e.g. Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523.
(3) A Prosecutor Must Abide by the Terms of an Agreement in Letter and Spirit.
In Santobello, the prosecutor and the defendant entered into negotiations: the
defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, which carried a prison sentence of

one year, and the prosecutor "agreed to make no recommendation as to the sentence."
404 U.S. at 258. After a series of delays, and after the judge, the prosecutor, and defense
counsel were replaced by other individuals, the new prosecutor requested "the maximum
one-year sentence," uL at 258-59, the defendant objected, UL at 259, and the judge
entered sentencing. The judge relied on the presentence report and ordered the maximum
sentence; he did not rely "at all" on what the prosecutor said. IcL at 259. The defendant
appealed and claimed the prosecutor breached the terms of the agreement. On certiorari
review, the United States Supreme Court agreed. It referred to the prosecutor's actions as
"another example of an unfortunate lapse in orderly prosecutorial procedure." IdL at 260.
Also, it stated "the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent
breach of agreement is immaterial." Id. at 262. It faulted the prosecution for failing to
ensure fairness at sentencing, it vacated the judgment, and it remanded the case for
specific performance of the agreement at sentencing before a different judge, or an
opportunity for the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. IdL at 263.
Under Santobello and its progeny, due process "requires that the bargain be kept
when the plea of guilty is entered." Van Buskirk v. State, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Nev.
1986); see also U.S. Const, amend. XIV (ensuring due process). Indeed, the government
"must adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it strikes with defendants." United States
v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978). A
prosecutor is held to a meticulous standard of promise and performance in both letter and
spirit. Citti v. State, 807 P.2d 724, 726 (Nev. 1991) (stating when the State enters a plea
agreement, "it 'is held to "the most meticulous standards of both promise and

performance"'") (citation omitted); United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th
Cir. 1991) (construing the plea agreement according to what the defendant reasonably
understood when he entered the plea), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991).
In United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992), the defendant entered
an agreement to plead guilty to four counts of defrauding a bank. During the plea
proceedings, the prosecutor stipulated that for sentencing purposes, the defendant's
"conduct did not involve more than minimal planning." IcL at 933, 940. Thereafter, the
United States Probation Office prepared the presentence report and increased the offense
level, stating that defendant's conduct "involved more than minimal planning," he "was
an organizer or leader of the crime charged," and he "abuse[d] a position of trust." IcL at
933. At sentencing, the prosecutor referenced the earlier stipulated agreement, but then
took "exception" and stated the defendant's conduct reflected "an affirmative step" in the
offense, where he was "concealing something." IcL at 939. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court sentenced the defendant based on the increased levels set forth
in the presentence report. Id. at 933.
On appeal, the court ruled that the prosecutor's statements at sentencing "violated
the spirit, if not the letter, of the plea agreement," and provided the trial court with a basis
for rejecting the sentence that defendant anticipated at the time of the plea. IcL at 940,
941. According to the court, "if the stipulation bargained for" by the defendant "is to
mean anything, it must preclude remarks like the government made here. We cannot
countenance such a blithe repudiation of the terms of a negotiated plea. "Santobello and
its progeny proscribe not only explicit repudiation of the government's assurances, but

must in the interests of fairness be read to forbid end-runs around them."5 Id. at 941
(internal citations omitted). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. IcL; see also United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir. 2004)
(remanding for breach of the plea agreement); State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432, 438 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981) (stating "[a] breach of a plea agreement occurs not only when the
prosecution breaks its promise, but also when the spirit of the inducement is breached")
(citation omitted); Van Buskirk, 720 P.2d at 1216 (stating "[t]he violation of the terms or
'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal"); State v. BlackwelU 522 S.E.2d 313, 315
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling the "defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes
that the State might create in its own promises"; and stating, "even if the State did not
violate the express terms of the plea agreement, it did violate the spirit of that
agreement") (emphasis in original); State v. Xaviar, 69 P.3d 901, 903-04 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (ruling the prosecutor's comments at sentencing constituted a breach of the
agreement, where the prosecutor recommended the sentence as promised, but then
"proceeded to (1) emphasize the graveness of the situation; (2) reiterate the charges that
the State did not bring; (3) note that the State had forgone the opportunity to ask for a 60year exceptional sentence; and (4) highlight aggravating circumstances that would
support an exceptional sentence," thereby effectively undercutting the plea agreement);
State v. Ferguson, 479 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating "Santobello
proscribes not only explicit repudiations of plea agreements, but also c end-runs around
them'"; and "[t]he state may not accomplish 'through indirect means what it promised
not to do directly,' i.e., convey a message to the trial court that a defendant's actions

warrant a more severe sentence than that recommended").
(4) If a Prosecutor Breaches an Agreement, Defendant Is Entitled to a Remedy.
"[W]hen a prosecutor fails to fulfill promises made to the defendant in negotiating
a plea bargain, the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated and he is entitled
to relief." Northeast Motor Co. v. N.C. State Board of Alcoholic Control 241 S.E.2d 727,
729 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. 257); see also Cittu 807 P.2d at
726 (stating a violation of the terms or the spirit of the agreement requires reversal)
(citation omitted). Relief should be determined by the trial court, and is either specific
performance or withdrawal of the plea (i.e., rescission). See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at
263 (stating the trial court is in a better position to decide the circumstances for relief);
West, 765 P.2d at 896 (stating when the State fails to fulfill its side of the bargain, the
remedy is frequently specific performance); State v. Felder, No. 20060837-CA, 2007 UT
App 172, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for specific performance); State v. Smith, No.
20060473-CA, No. 20060474-CA, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (unpublished) (same); State v.
Hawkins, No. 20050947-CA, 2006 UT App 410, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for
resentencing by a different judge); Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 3 (unpublished)
(remanding for plain error and a remedy where the State breached the plea agreement);
State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, f 17, 95 P.3d 1203 (stating the proper remedy for breach
of a plea agreement is specific performance or withdrawal of the plea); State v. Moss, 921
P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that a "remedy is constitutionally
required when the State reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea
agreement").

Even if there is reason to believe the judge was not influenced by the prosecutor's
breach of the agreement at sentencing, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "the
interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation
to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding
the case to the state courts for further consideration." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63.
B. THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED THAT IN EXCHANGE FOR SHAFFER'S
PLEA ON A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, SHE WOULD MAKE SENTENCING
RECOMMENDATIONS. THE PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE
AGREEMENT. SHAFFER IS ENTITLED TO A REMEDY.
The record supports that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in letter and
spirit. In exchange for Shaffer's guilty plea for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
the prosecutor agreed to abandon gun and gang enhancements against Shaffer, and she
agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at sentencing that the judge
suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term with credit for time served,
followed by probation. (SeeR. 99; 131:3-5).
Thereafter, the prosecutor breached the terms of the agreement. Specifically, she
did not make any recommendation for the presentence report as promised. (Compare R.
131:3-5 (reflecting promises); and R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report). She failed to
"adhere strictly to the terms of the bargains [she struck] with [the] defendant[]." U.S. v.
Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (recognizing
the prosecution must fulfill promise); CittU 807 P.2d at 726 (recognizing the government
is held to "cthe most meticulous standards of both promise and performance'") (citation
omitted). As a result, the agent preparing the report made minimal reference to the plea

agreement (R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, page 3 (stating only that "defendant pled
guilty as charged to Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony")), and he recommended
the maximum sentence: a prison term of five years to life. (Id., page 1).
Next, at sentencing, the prosecutor stated she would "stick with" the recommendations as agreed. (R. 132:13). However, she did not request two years in jail with credit
for time served, or expressly abandon sentencing for gang conditions. Rather, the prosecutor sent the message that two years in jail was insufficient. Indeed, she recommended
that Shaffer be sentenced "at [a] minimum''' to another year in jail (R. 132:14 (emphasis
added)) "with no credit for the time he's already served." (R. 132:13 (emphasis added)).
That statement violated the agreement. (See R. 99; 131:3-5 (reflecting the agreement
where the prosecutor would recommend two years in jail with credit for time served));
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating Santobello proscribes explicit repudiation of the
government's promises and it forbids "'end-runs around them'") (citations omitted);
Miller, 565 F.2d at 1274 (stating the prosecution "must adhere strictly to the terms of the
bargains it strikes with defendants"); Van Buskirk, 720 P.2d at 1216 (stating "[t]he
violation of the terms or 'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal"); BlackwelL 522
S.E.2d at 315 (ruling the "defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes that the
State might create in its own promises").
Moreover, the prosecutor expressed "concerns with the defendant's family" and
stated to the court that Shaffer's father was deceptive and manipulative (R. 132:13-14)
and his sister was a liar, "so frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true."
(R. 132:14). Those statements undermined the support for Shaffer in the community and

left the impression that the court should not have "any reassurance[]" that Shaffer would
"behave" if given a reduced incarceration term. (R. 132:13-14). The statements
constituted a violation of the agreement. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating the
prosecutor's remarks "were meant to serve as a possible basis for the district court to
ignore the stipulation in the plea agreement"); see also Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903-04
(recognizing that the prosecutor made the promised recommendations and also made
statements to undercut the plea agreement in violation of the promise).
In addition, the prosecutor advised the court that the victim, Cassidy Mills, "felt
that the defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible" on the first degree
felony. (R. 132:14). Since the longest possible incarceration would be prison for life, the
prosecutor's statements were an end-run around the promise to recommend a limited jail
term with credit for time served. (See R. 99; 131:3-5 (prosecutor's promises)); Rivera,
357 F.3d at 295-97 (remanding for breach of the agreement); Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941
(stating if the agreement "is to mean anything," it must preclude blithe repudiation of the
terms of the agreement and forbid "'end-runs around them'") (citation omitted); Xayiqr,
69 P.3d at 903-04 (stating the prosecutor recommended the sentence as agreed but also
emphasized the graveness of the situation, the charges the state did not bring, and other
circumstances to undercut the agreement); BlackwelL 522 S.E.2d at 315 (stating the
defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes in the State's promises).
Finally, the prosecutor requested "gang conditions" in sentencing, and claimed the
defense "has verified that he needs to have gang conditions." (R. 132:13). Yet the
defense verified no such thing. (See R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2 and 6

(denying affiliation with gangs)). The request for gang conditions was intended to send
the message that even though the prosecutor had agreed to abandon gang enhancements
(see R. 99; 131:3-5), she considered it necessary to brand Shaffer as affiliated with gangs.
That was improper. See Rivera, 357 F.3d at 295-97 (remanding for breach of the plea
agreement); Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating Santobello forbids "end-runs around"
the agreed upon promise); Xgviar, 69 P.3d at 903-04 (stating the prosecutor
recommended the sentence as agreed but also emphasized the graveness of the situation,
reiterated charges the state did not bring, and highlighted other circumstances to undercut
the plea agreement); Blackwell, 522 S.E.2d at 315 (stating the defendant should not be
forced to anticipate loopholes in the State's promises).
Shaffer did not receive the benefit of his bargain in the plea agreement. He is
entitled to a remedy: "[Wjhen a plea agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the proper
remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty
plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." Srnit, 2004 UT App 222, f 17; see also
Citti, 807 P.2d at 726 (stating that a violation of either "'the terms or "the spirit" of the
plea bargain requires reversal'") (citation omitted). The remedy should be determined by
the trial court under the circumstances and in further proceedings. See Santobello, 404
U.S. at 263 (stating the trial court is in a better position to decide the circumstances for
relief); see also Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 3 (unpublished) (remanding to the trial court
for the proper remedy, either specific performance or withdrawal of the agreement).
Shaffer respectfully requests that this Court remand the case for further proceedings and
relief.

C. THE COURT MAY ASSESS THE ISSUE UNDER THE PLAIN-ERROR OR
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL DOCTRINE.
Shaffer raises this sentencing issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, this Court
may review it under the plain-error doctrine or the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
doctrine. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 13, 95 P.3d 276 (stating "appellate courts will
not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances"); Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (considering plain error); see
also Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903 (stating "the defendant can raise the issue of the prosecutor's
breach for the first time on appeal").
(1) The Record Supports Plain Error.
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that c(i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant.'" Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (citing Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 15).
In this case, error exists where the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sentencing. (See supra, Argument B., herein). At the time of the agreement, the prosecutor
promised to recommend a suspended prison term and two years in jail with credit for
time served, and she promised to abandon both gun and gang enhancements in exchange
for Shaffer's plea. (R. 99; 131:3-5). Thereafter in connection with sentencing, the
prosecutor failed to make recommendations for the presentence report as promised; she
requested "at [a] minimum" an additional year in jail with "no credit" for time served;

she made statements to undercut Shaffer's community and family support; she reminded
the court of the abandoned enhancements by requesting "gang conditions;'9 and she
advised the court that the victim requested that Shaffer be incarcerated for "as long as
possible." (See R. 132:13-14). The prosecutor's breach of the agreement constituted
error. (See supra, Arguments A. and B., herein); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (referring to
the prosecutor's breach as "another example of an unfortunate lapse in orderly
prosecutorial procedures").
The trial judge would have been aware of the breach since the judge presided over
both the plea proceedings and the sentencing proceedings. (See R. 131; 132). In that
regard the breach was obvious. See_ Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (stating,
"The trial court committed plain error by not recognizing the breach and providing the
appropriate relief- 'specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the
guilty plea'") (citing SmiU 2004 UT App 222, \ 17).
Moreover, the error was harmful. An error is harmful if the State induced the
defendant to enter into the agreement with a promise. See_ Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262
(stating when a plea rests on a promise and the promise is the inducement or consideration, the prosecutor must fulfill the promise). In this case, the prosecutor induced Shaffer
to enter into a plea for a first degree felony offense by making promises. (R. 99; 131:35). Shaffer would not have entered the plea but for the promises. (See R. 131:3 (stating
the promises were "inducements" for the plea)). That is sufficient for the prejudice analysis. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating that even if the breach did not influence the
judge in sentencing, it warranted a remedy in the "interests of justice and [the] appro-

priate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to the promises made in the
negotiation of pleas"); see also Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (acknowledging that the prosecutor's promise was rendered meaningless, resulting in prejudice to
the defendant since he would not have entered the agreement but for the promise).
In addition, the error was harmful where the prosecutor's conduct in connection
with sentencing proceedings contributed to the trial court's decision to sentence Shaffer
to prison for life. (See R. 132:15-16 (reflecting trial court's sentencing)). Specifically,
the prosecutor did not honor her part of the agreement to make recommendations to the
agent preparing the presentence report. (Compare R. 131:3-5 (the prosecutor's promise);
and R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report). Consequently, the presentence report
unequivocally recommended a prison term (R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report), and the
trial court relied on the report to sentence Shaffer to prison. (R. 132:15). Also, the
prosecutor sent a decisively negative message to the trial court at sentencing where she
refused to recommend credit for time served, she requested another year in jail "at [a]
minimum," she claimed Shaffer's community support could not be trusted, she continued
to brand him as affiliated with gangs, and she specified that the victim was requesting the
longest possible sentence for the offense: life in prison. (R. 132:13-14). Those remarks
"were meant to serve as a possible basis for the district court to ignore the stipulation in
the plea agreement." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941; see also id,, at 940 (recognizing that
the prosecutor's statements at sentencing provided the trial court with a basis for rejecting
the earlier recommendations); Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 904 (stating "the prosecutor clearly
signaled to the court" her lack of support for the stipulation and "'effectively undercut the

plea agreement'") (citation omitted). Under the circumstances, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the trial court would not have ordered the maximum prison sentence if the
prosecutor had adhered to the terms of the bargain in letter and spirit. Indeed, if the
prosecutor had been held to the most meticulous standard in making sentencing
recommendations, the court likely would have entered a sentence more favorable to
Shaffer. That supports prejudice; Shaffer is entitled to a remedy. See_ Hale, 2005 UT
App 305, *2 (unpublished) (remanding for remedy under the plain-error analysis).
(2) The Record Supports Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution provides a criminal defendant
with the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the criminal
prosecution in state court. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-88
(1984); see also State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) (stating defendants are
"wholly dependent on the dedication of their attorneys to protect their interests and to
ensure their fair treatment under the law"); U.S. Const, amend. VI. To establish a claim
of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show, first, that his attorney's performance
was deficient in that it "'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and
second, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Templin, 805 P.2d at
186-87 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ^ |
7 & 10, 132 P.3d 703 (stating this Court will consider ineffective assistance of counsel
even where trial counsel "affirmatively approved" of erroneous matters at trial).
For the first step, the United States Supreme Court has stated the following:

A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court
should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing
professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the
particular case.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added); Templin, 805 P.2d at 186.
The first prong of the analysis is obvious in the law and on the face of the record
here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (stating an ineffectiveness claim must be judged on
the facts of the case at the time of the conduct). The prosecutor breached the letter and
the spirit of the plea agreement. (See, supra, Argument B., herein). In the face of that
breach, defense counsel failed to object; she remained silent even though the prosecutor
plainly failed to make recommendations in connection with the presentence report as
promised (compare R. 131:3-5 (reflecting promises), and 134: AP&P Presentence
Report; see also, supra, Argument C.(l), herein), and even though the prosecutor
specifically requested "no credit" for time served and that Shaffer serve another year in
jail "at [a] minimum"; claimed that Shaffer's community support could not be trusted;
continued to brand Shaffer as affiliated with gangs; and represented that the victim
requested incarceration for Shaffer "for as long as possible." (R. 132:13-14).
Defense counsel's silence in the face of the prosecutor's breach of the agreement
is not the result of reasonable professional judgment. See, e.g.. Hale, 2005 UT App 305,
*1 n.3 (finding it interesting that defendant did not assert ineffective assistance of counsel
"based on [defense] counsel's failure to mention or attempt to enforce the plea agreement

at sentencing"; and ruling the prosecutor's breach was plain error). Effective counsel
would have known the law and his or her duty to the client. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688 (stating counsel "has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process"); see also ABA Stds for Crim. Justice,
Prosecution Function and Defense Function (hereinafter "ABA Stds"), §§ 4-1.2(b), 4-3.6,
4-7.9 (3d ed. 1993) (requiring defense counsel to make proper objections).
Effective counsel would have made a professional and competent objection under
the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (setting forth defense counsel's
duty to provide effective assistance and to "advocate the defendant's cause"); see also
ABA Stds, §§ 4-3.6, 4-7.9; 1 Criminal Practice Manual, §6:14, page 6-9 (Thompson/
West 2005) (stating ineffective assistance is found in failure to object; stating a lawyer
must focus on whether the process is fair). There is no conceivable reason to forego an
objection when established law provides a remedy for a prosecutor's breach of the agreement. See Santobello, 404 U.S. 257; Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *2 (unpublished)
(recognizing that a defendant is entitled to a remedy for a prosecutor's breach); Moss,
921 P.2d at 1026 (stating that "some remedy is constitutionally required when the State
reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea agreement"). Under the
circumstances, counsel's deficiencies fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. See. State v. Is on,
2006 UT 26, ^ 32, 135 P.3d 864 (stating counsel cannot be excused for failing to recognize potential issues at trial where no strategic reason exists for foregoing issue).
In addition, Shaffer was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Under the law,

prejudice exists if the State induced the defendant to enter into the agreement with a
promise, and then breached the promise. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating when a
plea rests on a promise and the promise is the inducement or consideration, the
prosecutor must fulfill the promise). In this case, the State made promises for sentencing
to induce Shaffer to plead guilty to a first degree felony offense. (R. 131:3-5).
Thereafter, the prosecutor's statements constituted a breach of the agreement. (See,
supra, Argument B., herein). That supports prejudice. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262
(stating that even if the breach did not influence the judge in sentencing, it warranted a
remedy in the "interests of justice and [the] appropriate recognition of the duties of the
prosecution in relation to the promises made in the negotiation of pleas"); see also Hale,
2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (acknowledging that the prosecutor's promise was
rendered meaningless, and defendant would not have admitted the allegations but for the
promise); Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903 (stating the "constitutional dimensions of the plea
agreement make it essential that the State fulfill its 'implied promise to act in good
faith'"). As stated above, if defense counsel had promptly objected, Shaffer would have
been entitled to a remedy. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; West, 765 P.2d at 896
(stating when the State fails to fulfill its side of the bargain, the remedy is frequently
specific performance); Felder, 2007 UT App 172, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for
specific performance); Smith, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (unpublished) (same); Hawkins,
2006 UT App 410, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for resentencing); Hale, 2005 UT App
305, *2 (unpublished) (remanding for a remedy); Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ^| 17 (stating
the proper remedy for breach of a plea agreement is specific performance or withdrawal

of the plea); Moss, 921 P.2d at 1026 (recognizing that "some remedy is constitutionally
required when the State reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea
agreement"); (see also, supra, pages 11-12, 20-22, herein).
In addition, if defense counsel had requested that the prosecutor be held to her
promises, there is a reasonable likelihood that the agent preparing the presentence report
would have taken the promised recommendations into consideration for the report. (See
R. 131:3-5 (reflecting prosecutor's promise to make recommendations for the
presentence report); see also, supra. Argument C.(l), herein). Likewise, if defense
counsel had requested that the prosecutor be held to her promises, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the trial court would have taken the recommendations into consideration
for a sentence more favorable to Shaffer. (See R. 131:3-5 (reflecting the prosecutor's
promises)); see also Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating the prosecutor's remarks possibly served as a basis for the court to ignore the agreed upon sentence). That supports
prejudice. See, e.g.. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (stating prejudice
exists if there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant).
Finally, if counsel had objected to the prosecutor's breach, Shaffer would have
properly preserved the issue for appeal. Because trial counsel failed to object, Shaffer
has been forced to argue plain error. (See supra, Argument C.(l), herein). His rights on
appeal have been compromised by counsel's deficiencies. He should not be further
punished for trial counsel's errors. This Court can and should address the issue on the
merits to alleviate any additional prejudice against Shaffer in the matter.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Shaffer respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the sentence, and remand the case for a proper remedy.
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1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 12/15/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
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Defendant.

I, A hsc\U£*YY\ Q\/\o.+Jr r , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading4uilty)(or no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision
A.

^^^^

VCK

^A

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

fc^j(^»*'M
A —

B.

C.
D.

1

$ l£>j

aon

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crhne(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, (or no contest) are:

/ » n&-

I ~ &>l

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest):
£Lb
^ f a ^ u ^ r ^ 3 0 ^ Z^Qogf

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I {have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / n CCCUAJ&
CU-r^\faj^^
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and thexonsequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know-that if I do not plead guilty
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each

element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
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Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) ((jQare) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction oftitlecharges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am 2I)years of age. I have attended school through the / '2- grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drags, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and volimtarily entering my plea.

-

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Dated this 1 5

day of

Vece^loe^

, 2 Qh?>
t

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for Ah^L<x+* Mcxr/p %U&£f*<^ the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

ATTORN£Y FOR DEFENDANT

BarNo.

LfKl I

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
Akrw/in*^
Sn-J'ttS^
7 defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been ofifered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
m the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.
^
^

PROSECUTE^ ATTORNEY

BarNo._Z^V^

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thattihedefendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

1 fT day of

D^cemb^^"

.2 Dbg.
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MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Your Honor, would[ the Court be

will ing to call Abraham Mario Shaffer?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
MS. JOHNSON:

He's in custody.

Sandi Johnson for the State.

MS. CHRISTIANSEN:

McCaye Christianson appearing

with Mr . Shaffer.
Judge, this matter, I believe, is set for
disposition today and we do have a negotiated resolution to
put on the record today.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MS. CHRISTIANSEN:

Your Honor

what is contemplated

is that Mr. Shaffer will enter a guilty plea to aggravated
robbery, a first-degree felony, as charged in the Information.
In exchange for that, there are three things that
have been offered, inducements that have been offered by the
State.

The first is that in connection with the--the charge

in the Information, the State was pursuing both a gun
enhancement and a gang enhancement, which would have added a
3

total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case,
and those will be abandoned by the State in exchange for the
plea.
Additionally, your Honor, the State will be
recommending at the--both to the--the pre-sentence
investigator and at the time of sentencing to your Honor, that
the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that the
Court instead order Mr. Shaffer to serve two years in the
County Jail, with credit for time served.
Finally, in the event that Mr. Shaffer is successful
in completing this five-year probationary period, upon being
released from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does
choose to approve that--that sentencing recommendation, at the
conclusion of the five years, probation having been
successfully completed, the State will be joining in my motion
for the degree of the offense to be lowered by one level, from
a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

And your Honor, I have reviewed,

I have filled out and reviewed a--a plea form with my client.
I read the entire form out loud to him and he read (inaudible)
along with me.
THE COURT:

I see.

That's the State's offer in this

case, Counsel?
MS. JOHNSON:

It is, your Honor, and we would move
4

1

to amend Count 1 by just striking the language, it's halfway

2

down through the paragraph, the sentence ends:

and/or caused

3

serious bodily injury to Cassie Mills, period.

Then it's the

4

next sentence, begins, "Further."

5

the remaining of that paragraph, the State would strike that,

6

with the understanding he's going to be pleading guilty to

7

Count 1 then as charged.

8
9

THE COURT:

Starting with "further",

Now, is Mr. Shaffer the one who had the

firearm in this robbery?

10

MS. JOHNSON:

11

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Shaffer, the State's made an offer

12

of--to have you plead guilty to aggravated robbery, as

13

charged, except the enhancement would be stricken, the

14

enhancements.

15

Is that what you understand?

16

MR. SHAFFER:

17

(Inaudible discussion between Counsel and Mr.

18

Yes, your Honor.

Shaffer)

19

MR. SHAFFER:

20

THE COURT:

Y e s , your Honor.
M r . Shaffer, let m e just explain.

The

21

sentence that you face is--is a sentence of five years to life

22

in prison.

23

even though the State is not recommending that, in fact, is

24

recommending a jail sentence instead.

25

you on probation, they'd recommend that you--that your--with

And there's no guarantee that I won't impose that,

And if I chose to put

1

guilty plea to the first-degree felony be withdrawn and you

2

enter it, instead, to a second-degree felony.

3

are not binding on me.

4

that way, I wouldn't accept it.

5

that I could give you the five-year-to-life sentence and

6

there's no promise, no guarantee of any kind that you won't

7

get that.

Those things

If they were and if it were proposed
So, I want to make it clear

Do you understand that?

8

MR. SHAFFER:

9

THE COURT:

I understand.
If you plead guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're

10

giving up the right that you have to a speedy trial before a

11

public and impartial jury.

12

this charge and all of its elements and you have the right to

13

a jury trial.

14

beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of all the

15

elements of the offense and they'd have to convince the jury

16

unanimously that you were guilty of all the elements of this

17

offense or you would not be found guilty.

You're presumed to be innocent of

The State would have to convince the jury

18

At the trial, you have the right to remain silent,

19

no one could force you to testify against yourself; in other

20

words, you have the right to be free from compulsory self-

21

incrimination.

22

testify and let the jury hear your side of what happened.

But at the trial, if you wanted to, you could

23

In fact, you'd have the right to have other

24

witnesses testify for you and to have those witnesses

25

subpoenaed and their attendance at trial compelled.

You'd

1

have the right to cross-examine or ask questions of the

2

State's attorney

3
4

(sic), you have the right to an appeal.

If you plead guilty today, you're giving up all of
those r i g h t s .

Do y o u understand all of that?

5

MR. SHAFFER:

6

THE COURT:

Y e s , your Honor.
The only right that you're not giving up

7

of that group is the right to an appeal, but that right is

8

certainly limited if y o u plead guilty.

9

that?

10

MR. SHAFFER:

11

THE COURT:

Y e s , your Honor.
By pleading guilty, M r . Shaffer, you're

12

admitting that you committed the crime.

13

that?

14

MR. SHAFFER:

15

THE COURT:

16

Do y o u understand

Do y o u understand

Y e s , your H o n o r .
Are you willing to admit that you

committed this crime?

17

Did you have a question, M r . Shaffer?

18

MR. SHAFFER:

19

I just asked what the difference was

between guilty and no contest plea.

20

THE COURT:

I don't think the State would accept a

21

no contest plea and I don't believe that I would, either, in

22

this c a s e .

23

you don't have to and we could set this matter for trial.

So, if y o u don't want to plead guilty, of course,

24

MR. SHAFFER:

25

THE COURT:

I plead guilty.
Okay.

If y o u plead guilty, you're

1

admitting that you committed the crime and I'm going to define

2

it for you.

3

unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take,

4

personal property in the possession of someone else from that

5

person or from their immediate presence and against their will

6

and that y o u did so by means of force or fear and that you

7

used or threatened the use of a dangerous w e a p o n , those--or--

8

and/or y o u caused serious bodily injury, w h i c h I don't believe

9

is alleged h e r e .

It alleges that you, as a p a r t y to the offense,

But those are the elements of the offense.

10

Do you understand that, Mr.

11

MR. SHAFFER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SHAFFER:

15

THE COURT:

M S . JOHNSON:

18

T H E COURT:

20

A r e y o u willing to admit that you

Y e s , your Honor.
I'm going to ask the S t a t e , if you

would, p l e a s e , to explain the factual b a s i s for this charge.

17

19

Y e s , your Honor.

committed that crime a I explained it to y o u ?

14

16

Shaffer?

Sorry, your Honor?
M s . Johnson, could I h a v e you explain

the factual basis for the charge?
M S . JOHNSON:

Your Honor, on J a n u a r y 3 0th of 2 008,

21

the defendant, along with two other i n d i v i d u a l s , entered a

22

Sprint telephone store.

23

specifically walked into a bathroom, p o i n t e d a gun at the cell

24

phone's employer--or employee of the store and demanded

25

more p h o n e s .

They then took p h o n e s , the defendant

some

He then ran out of that store's closet with, I

1

believe, it was eight cell phones.

And then the other

2

individuals that were outside in the main part of the room,

3

took money out of the till.

4

the store.

Those individuals then fled from

5

THE COURT:

6

Does Mr. Shaffer disagree with any part of the

7

I see.

proffer by the State's attorney?

8

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

9

MR. SHAFFER:

No, Judge.

No, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

Mr. Shaffer, I'll find that it does in fact make out

12
13

Okay.

the factual basis.
Mr. Shaffer, the form in front of you, your attorney

14

said she read it, you followed along; did you read it and

15

understand it?

16

MR. SHAFFER:

17

THE COURT:

18

Yes, your Honor.
Did you--are you willing to give up

those rights?

19

MR. SHAFFER:

Y e s , your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SHAFFER:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE BAILIFF:

Are you right-handed?

24

MR. SHAFFER:

Yeah, right.

25

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Are y o u doing all of this voluntarily?

Yes, your Honor.
I'll ask you to sign it then, please.

Permission to approach, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

I'll--thank you.

I'll accept it and

make it a part of the record.
Mr. Shaffer, do you have any other questions for
your attorney?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

No.

Not at the moment.

All right.

To the charge of aggravated

robbery, a first-degree felony, how is--what is your plea,
guilty or not guilty?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:

Guilty.
I'll accept the guilty plea.

I'll refer Mr. Shaffer to the Department of
Corrections for a pre-sentence report.
And set sentencing, unless there's an objection, on
February the 9th at 9:00 o'clock.
MS. CHRISTIANSON:

That works for me, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shaffer, we'll see you back

Okay.

then.
MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Thank you, Judge.

That's all I

have, if I may be excused.
THE COURT:

Sure.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
* * *
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MS. CHRISTIANSON:

Your Honor, would the Court be

willing to call Abraham Shaffer.
THE COURT:

I sure will.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
THE COURT:
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

May I approach, your Honor?

Yes, you may.
Sandi Johnson for the State.
Counsel, I received the papers from the

Judicial Supervision Services this morning that you'd sent
over.
MS. CHRISTIANSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
with Abraham Shaffer.

Great.

McCaye Christianson appearing

This matter is set for sentencing, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

And I have read

the report, again, and I'm familiar with the information there
as well as letters that have been submitted and the--the
review of the information from Judicial Supervision Services.
So, Counsel, go ahead.

3

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

All right, your Honor.

Thank

you.
Your Honor, what--as the Court is aware, at the time
of our sentencing in this matter, there was a negotiated
settlement of the charges and as a part of those negotiations,
the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the time
that the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of
that year, they would recommend he be placed on probation.
And I'm asking the Court this morning to follow the
State's recommendation, which I believe the State will be
renewing later and which time--the State had agreed to at the
time that the pleas were taken--that the plea was taken.
There are two specific matters I'd like to address,
your Honor, if the Court will indulge me-THE COURT:

Sure.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:

--in regards to the pre-sentence

report that was prepared by A P & P and also some of these
matters are echoed in the second report that was prepared by
Judicial Supervision Services.

First of all, your Honor, the-

-the pre-sentence reports, both pre-sentence reports indicated
that they felt that Abraham was minimizing his involvement in
this--the robbery that occurred.
And so I'd like to just review the--the facts a
little bit with your Honor in regards to what happened in this
underlying count.

4

The allegation is that Abraham and two other young
men went to the cell phone business, Sprint Communications,
that they went in.

When they arrived, Abraham did not

brandish a firearm, he went back to a storage room in back of
the store and loaded up his arms with cell phones and as he
was leaving the storage room, he was confronted by Cassie
Mills, a very intrepid and courageous clerk who worked in the
store, who actually, physically confronted Abraham, dislodging
some of the cell phones from Abraham's arms.
When Abraham bent down to pick up those cell phones,
he, Abraham says, that a gun which he had in his waist band
fell out of his waist band and he then picked it up and held
it on Mr. Mills and ordered Mr. Mills onto the floor and
ordered him to stay, this would be at gun point that he
ordered Mr. Mills to stay on the floor.

And so he and the

(inaudible) the crime scene.
Mr. Mills has indicated that--or--or testified at
the prelim and otherwise indicated that Abraham pulled the
gun--the phones fell, Abraham pulled the gun out of his waist
band, dropped the gun, picked up the gun and the phones and
then held the gun on Mr. Mills.
So, there is a slight discrepancy in whether the gun
fell first or was pulled out first, but everybody agrees that
Abraham did hold the gun on Mr. Mills, that he pointed it at
Mr. Mills at close range and that he ordered Mr. Mills to get

5

on the floor.
So, I think everyone agrees, including Abraham, that
the behavior was extremely menacing and did involve forcing
Mr. Mills onto the ground with the use of a firearm.
Additionally, your Honor, both pre-sentence
investigators got kind of hung up on whether or not Abraham
had said--had threatened to blow Mr. Mills' head off. Abraham
said that he didn't make that threat and in reviewing the--the
police reports and other documentation in regards to this
case, I just wanted to indicate to the Court, there was an
initial police report on the day of the robbery in which the
police report attributed to Mr. Mills' statement that--that
Abraham had said, Get on the floor and if you don't stay
there, I'll blow your head off.
But then Mr. Mills was interviewed later in the day,
the same day of the robbery, by a police officer who quoted
Mr. Mills, in quotation marks, as saying that Abraham told
him, Get on the floor and stay there until we leave the store
and there was no mention of a threat to blow his head off.
Mr. Mills, that same day, wrote a statement, which I
have provided to the Court, a handwritten statement, in which
he says that Abraham had ordered him to get on the floor and
stay there and there's no mention of blowing his head off.
And then again, Mr. Mills actually testified at a
preliminary hearing in this matter and was posed a question on

6

any statements or threats that may have been made to him at
the time of the robbery and at the prelim, when specifically
asked whether he was threatened, he said that he was not;
although, of course, he said, you know, he was holding a gun
to my head.

I mean, there--there was obviously a--not only an

implicit but an overt threat of violence, but at the prelim,
he did not testify in regards to any verbal threat to blow his
head off being made.
And your Honor, I--personally, I don't really think
it's that important, but I just wanted to clarify that with
the Court that that really is in dispute and it appears that-that even--it's not necessarily clear that even Mr. Mills
would assert that those exact words were said.
I don't know that it matters what exact words were
said, he had a gun held to his head and obviously, there was a
threat, an overt threat.

I don't know that it matters, but I-

-I'm only going over that with the Court here because I feel
that the pre-sentence investigators sort of clung to that
discrepancy to make their case that Abraham wasn't accepting
responsibility.

And I think that he has accepted

responsibility for robbing someone at gun point, regardless of
what exactly--what words were--were said at the time.
Also, your Honor, in the--the pre-sentence report
that was done by A P & P, the investigator suggests that
Abraham isn't taking responsibility because he doesn't admit

7

being a member in a gang.

And the--the A P & P investigator

seems to feel that because there was originally a gang
enhancement charged in this case and because Abraham referred
to the co-perpetrators by nicknames that that proves that
Abraham--Abraham is a gang member.

And obviously, the gang

enhancement is more of a group enhancement, not necessarily
indicating gang membership and I think the fact that Abraham
may have known nicknames which--which the co-perpetrators used
doesn't mean that he was a member of their gang or--or I don't
know if they were in the same gang, if they are gang members,
but I don't think that there's proof of gang membership here.
And the fact that Abraham denies gang membership, I think,
should not be seen as denial of responsibility or refusal to
admit what he did here.
All right.

Next, your Honor, the--the pre-sentence

investigators remarked on the write-ups that Abraham had
during the, I think it's been about, I don't know, 14 months
now that he's been in the County Jail, and it's true that
Abraham has had numerous write-ups, but he--he has brought
those with him this morning and I don't know if the Court
would like to look those over.

I have those if the Court

would like to see those; but your Honor, they're write-ups for
passing a note, passing an envelope, passing a candy bar.

His

toilet got clogged and he was sweeping the water out of his
cell into the corridor.

I--I don't see any indication that--

8

that the toilet was deliberately clogged, but it's a matter
of--of how he was dealing with the water by sweeping it into
the corridor that was a problem.
He had a pen, on one occasion.

He believed that a

guard had removed some food from his tray to antagonize him
and--and he threw the tray, not at the guard, but out--out of
the--I'm sorry, it was not a guard, but an inmate, who
apparently had removed some food, (inaudible) and Abraham
threw the tray, not at the other inmate, however.
So, I just want to say that I think looking over the
write-ups, I think that they show some immaturity on Abraham's
part, some difficulty adjusting to the extremely stressful and
highly constrained circumstances of the jail, but there isn't
anything like an attack on a guard, an attack on another
prisoner, there's no allegation of a criminal misconduct in
the jail.
And I have talked to Abraham about the--the
seriousness, even, of--of minor matters and the importance of
complying with all the rules while he is in the County Jail.
And I believe that he is resolved to--to not give into
childish impulses to act out, not to do things like--like
giving someone an envelope or giving someone a candy bar that
might seem insignificant, but that nevertheless is a breach in
a security institution and is a violation of the rules.
And I believe that if the Court would--would follow

9

the State's recommendation in this matter and give Abraham the
opportunity to serve an additional year in the jail, that
these types of infractions will not continue to occur.
And next, your Honor, I--I just wanted to point out
to the Court that I did provide the Court with a couple of
photographs that Abraham's mother wanted the Court to have
and--and I know that the Court, there are many, many, many
matters pending before the Court and I don't know if the Court
has any independent recollection of Abraham's appearances, but
his family has been present at his appearances, his mother and
sisters are here today, as well as his spiritual advisor, Rod
Gilmore.
Abraham has a very, very supportive and loving
family and his mother wanted the Court to have those
photographs just to let the Court know that--that Abraham is
a--a young person who, until late in his teenage years, was
(inaudible) youth; in recent years, he has been arrested a
number of times, according to their--I think there are a few
or a couple of misdemeanor convictions on his record, but no
felony convictions.

And his--his family just wanted the Court

to know that he is--that he has been a--a good and highfunctioning, loyal, treasured member of their family and they- their belief is that he has the determination to become that
again.
The Court has letters from past employers who are--
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have really valued Abraham's services as an employee and
would--would welcome the opportunity of again engaging his
services when he's released from the County Jail.
Your Honor, also, I just want to draw the Court's
attention to the--the issue of inter-case proportionality.
The co-perpetrators in this matter, my understanding is that
they served a year in jail and were then placed on probation
after pleading guilty to second-degree felonies.

And I feel,

since Abraham was the only person who is known to have been
carrying a gun on that day, it makes sense that he enter a
plea to a first as opposed to a second and that he would serve
two or two-plus years in jail rather than one year in jail;
but I think looking at the way that the co-perpetrators were
handled, the resolution that was endorsed by Ms. Johnson on
behalf of the District Attorney's Office makes sense.
And finally, your Honor, I just wanted to let the
Court know that during the pendency of these proceedings
before your Honor, I've had opportunity to visit on numerous
occasions with Abraham and he has expressed his remorse to me,
he's expressed profound shame and regret about his behavior.
He's expressed, on his own, without being prompted, he's
expressed sympathy for the--the victim and speculated that it
would be a very terrifying experience to be robbed at
gunpoint.

He's expressed regret that he ever was engaged in

behavior that would have caused so much fear to another
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person.
And your Honor, I--my impression, based on my
dealing with him is that his expressions of remorse are
sincere and that he genuinely desires to address problems in
his life that have led to this low point and to--to change his
life and become--to get back on the track that he was on as a
younger man and not have any future involvement with the
criminal justice system.
I believe if the Court follows the State's
recommendations, that Abraham will not disappoint you.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shaffer, anything else you'd

like to say?
MR. SHAFFER:
THE COURT:
MR. SHAFFER:

Yes, your Honor.
Go ahead.
Well, I would like to apologize for--

as to the behavior I did.

I really am deeply sorry for just

being so stupid and allowing myself to do something so--this
is a terrible thing that I did, a aggravated robbery and
robbing someone at gunpoint.

I--I didn't realize at the time

how long it would be, but--and how terrifying it would be to
be a store clerk at that time.

If he were here, I would like

to apologize to him.
And I want to apologize to my family for acting the
way I did and letting them down with my (inaudible) a criminal
act and I want--I want to try my hardest if I get another
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chance to get back on the right track and get on with my life
and just be--be a credit to the society (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, Ms. Johnson, did you have

comments or recommendations?
MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, I would just note that the

State is recommending that the defendant be given 3 65 days
jail with no credit for the time he's already served, that
after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with Adult
Probation & Parole.
I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant
may claim he's not a member of a gang, given that the codefendants he was with were members of gangs, they're
documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that
he needs to have gang conditions.
I was unaware of the defendant's write-ups at the
jail until I received the pre-sentence report, which was prior
to my recommendation.

I've reviewed those, I'm still going to

stick with my recommendation.

It is a zero tolerance.

In this case, although the defendant's is now being
very supported, I have concerns with the defendant's family;
frankly, his father, your--your Honor actually heard the
material witness hearing where the father went and manipulated
a--a gentleman into writing a false statement about Mr.
Shaffer's whereabouts.

And so I think his family support

doesn't necessarily give me any reassurances that he's going
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to behave.
And his sister went in and lied to his attorney and
then forwarded that--that on to myself in order to get him
off.

His father went and procured a false statement; so,

frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true.
While he may have been a good boy at one point, he
did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I
think warrants, at minimum, another year in jail followed by
36-months probation.
THE COURT: Okay.
And the complaining witness is not here, Counsel, to
speak?
MS. JOHNSON:

No, your Honor, Mr. Mills is not here.

He did express to me on numerous occasions, including at the
preliminary hearing, that--well, first of all, with regard to
restitution, that restitution amount does need to be ordered.
The phones were returned to Sprint, but they were not able to
be sold at all and the restitution amount of $2,13 6, I did
verify with Mr. Mills and Sprint--or Sprint Communications,
actually, I guess, that that is the amount of restitution for
those phones.

They had all been removed from the boxes and

been compromised, their--the chips and so they were unable to
be sold.
And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible.
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I did talk with him about the resolution and he was
fine with the resolution.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Shaffer, it's a difficult

decision for me, because of your age, really.

If you weren't

as young as you are, there would be no question in my mind
that I would sentence you to prison.
In looking at what you've been charged with doing,
the crime certainly warrants the sentence of imprisonment.
Whether or not the gun fell first or whether you pulled it
from your waist band really isn't critical and I suppose
whether you uttered the words "Get down on the ground or I'm
going to shoot you or blow your head off," the threat was
certainly there.

It's hard to interpret in any other way when

you pulled a gun on him.
And then the fact that not only did--did your
friends and yourself steal the phones that I guess they'd gone
on--into the store to steal in the first place, but looted the
till and took additional merchandise from the front of the
store, it's such a serious crime, Mr. Shaffer, I'm comfortable
with the recommendations that they make here, as difficult as
it is.

I'm going to follow them and impose the indeterminate

term of five years to life in the State penitentiary.
I'll also order that you pay the restitution in the
sum of $2,136, that would be jointly and severally with the
co-defendants; but--but given what you've done here, it just
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seems to me that a sentence of imprisonment is the only
reasonable sentence.

So, I'll follow the recommendation.

MS. CHRISTIANSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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